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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. JumoioL CONTROL oF AGENoIEs
Lee County SehooZ District Number I v. Gardner,' the most
interesting case to arise in the administrative law field, concerned
school desegregation. The legal issues were judicial control over
a governmental agency and the accompanying question of sov-
ereign immunity. Since the case was decided on a motion t dis-
miss, its merits were never reached. The question was whether
the United States Commissioner of Education had the right to
defer payment of federal funds to the plaintiff school district
without a hearing. The court denied the defendant's dismissal
motion, but at the same time delayed giving a ruling by directing
the parties to proceed through channels to a final administrative
decision and then to reappear before the court. In this way the
district court preserved its jurisdiction while allowing for the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act2 empowers the Commis-
sioner of Education to withhold federal funds from schools that
practice racial discrimination. To continue receiving these grants,
schools must meet certain desegregation plans or guidelines. The
plaintiff's attempts to comply were deemed insufficient by the
Commissioner who "deferred" the funds. The school district
promptly brought this action to enjoin the deferral. The defend-
ant moved for dismissal on two grounds: First, that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity prevented the suit against the government,
and second, that the court could not properly take jurisdiction
before the administrative process was complete.
Because many administrative law cases involve suits against
government agencies, sovereign immunity is an often raised
defense. This doctrine is not a defense to a complaint that alleges
that the government's agent acted outside the scope of his au-
thority. The theory is that the agent is no longer acting for the
government and a suit against him is against him individually.,
Since the complaint did allege ultra vires activity, the court
easily rejected this part of Commissioner's defense. A more subtle
point was reached when the defendant attempted to show an
analogy between this case and the landmark United States Su-
preme Court cases of Larsen v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
1. 263 F. Supp. 26 (D.S.C. 1967).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)2 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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Corp.4 and Land v. Dollar.9 These cases held that a suit to obtain
government property was a suit against the sovereign.
The district court reasoned that the school district was not
suing to obtain funds, but to enjoin an illegal withholding. The
court said, "Rather than demanding positive official action on
the part of defendants, this complaint only requests that the
defendants be ordered to cease an allegedly unlawful interference
with the flow of funds to which the plaintiffs are already other-
wise legally entitled."' Perhaps this was a way of saying that a
history of receiving and relying on the grants gave the school
district an expectation right. A suit to have these funds con-
tinued was not the same as a suit to have the grants initiated.
The Commissioner's second defense was that administrative
remedies had not been exhausted. When the suit was brought, the
administrative process was at a standstill. The Commissioner had
clogged the machinery by deferring the funds without a hearing.
The right to a hearing is dictated by the Civil Rights Act.7 The
plain meaning of the statute requires that an opportunity for a
hearing be provided before funds are cut off. The time specified
for a hearing usually depends on the effect of the pending
administrative action.8 In this case, as the court pointed out,
cutting off the funds would seriously cripple the school system.
The court found it ironic that the Commissioner used exhaustion
of administrative remedies as a defense when in reality it was he
who was delaying the process by his inaction.
The case shows a court's ability to crank stalled administrative
machinery. Pragmatically, it assured the plaintiff of reaching its
overdue hearing.
A recent United States Supreme Court case should also be
mentioned. The Court in See v. City of Seattle9 held that admin-
istrative entry of a non-public business was illegal without a
search warrant. This brought a significant change to the existing
4. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
5. 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
6. Lee County School Dist. Number I v. Gardner, 263 F. Supp. 26 (D.S.C.
1967).
7. 1962 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)l (1964). The Act gives the
Commissioner a means of effectuating compliance: "(1) by the termination of
or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to
any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement. . ....
(emphasis added).
8. K. DAvs, ADMINIsTmu LAW TEXT § 8.08, at 154 (1959).
9. 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967).
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administrative search and seizure law.10 The well known Fra?
v. Maryland case had held such a search to be constitutional
"[w]henever the authorities shall have cause to suspect that a
nuisance exists in any house. . . ."I In See the Court continued
to apply its standard test of "reasonableness," but it has now
imposed new restrictions in deciding what searches will be con-
sidered reasonable. The four member minority of the Court
strongly objected to overruling Frank. They called the majority
opinion a prostitution of the fourth amendment.
II. AD iiisTRv- CoNVNrENmFO
Drew v. Lawrimore'2 was a federal case interpreting a federal
statute, but has been included in the survey because the decision
affects South Carolina farmers. In Drew the district court re-
manded a decision of the Marketing Quota Review Committee.
The committee is a federal adjudicatory body set up by the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act.' 3 It hears grievances that a farmer
might have about his market quota. The court's basic disagree-
ment with the committee was that it had used improper standards
in determining the plaintiff's quota.. The committee had refused
to consider the economic use of Drew's land.
The plaintiff was a Marion County tobacco farmer. His tobacco
quota depended on the administrative area or "community" in
which his land was classified. His farm was placed in the
Marion community. This made his maximum tobacco allotment
about 10,000 pounds less than if it had been classified in either
of two nearby communities. An expert testified that Drew's
land was composed of excellent tobacco growing soil. The plain-
tiff contended that this was good reason to have his farm placed
in one of the other communities. The reviewing committee kept
plaintiff's land in the Marion community and refused to consider
the quality of the soil.
Marketing allotments are made under the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act.14 The defendants stated that it had never been their
policy to consider soil analysis or the economic use of the land in
fixing the community boundaries. They attempted to use this
past administrative interpretation to support their classification
10. See, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
11. Id. at 367.
12. 257 F. Supp. 659 (D.S.C. 1966).
13. Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1363 (1938).
14. Id. § 1281.
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standards. However, the district court agreed with Drew that
the quality of the land must be considered. The court stated that
the basic authority for market quota allotments stemmed from
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act.15 The policy
provisions of the Act clearly include preservation and improve-
ment of soil fertility and promotion of the land's economic use
as factors to be considered in governing the size of allotments.' 6
The court held that a policy based on administrative convenience
could not be persuasive when the statute expressed a contrary
meaning. It met the administrative construction argument by
saying that no legislative acquiesence could be deemed meaning-
ful in the light of an unambiguous statute.
III. ExHAusTioN OF ADmINISTRATIVE RE unnEs
E m parte Allstate Insurance Co.17 showed that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is truly discretionary with
South Carolina courts. The South Carolina Supreme Court had
said this before,18 but this was its first chance to prove it. The
court found that the Insurance Commissioner was clearly acting
beyond his statutory delegated powers in investigating the re-
spondent companies' political activities. Because the investiga-
tion was so clearly beyond the Commissioner's authority, the
court held that the circuit court had not erred in taking original
jurisdiction.
In early March 1966, the South Carolina legislature was con-
sidering a uniform rate bill for automobile insurance. The
insurance companies, through advertisement and letters to policy
holders, opposed the legislation as detrimental to free enterprise
contending that the rate fixing law would eliminate competition
in automobile insurance sales. The House of Representatives
passed a resolution condemning these publications as misleading
and requested that the Insurance Commissioner investigate. The
Commissioner began the investigation and the respondents asked
the circuit court for an injunction. It was granted on the ground
15. Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 590 (1935).
16. Id. § 590(g). The act states: "(a) It is declared to be the policy of this
chapter also to secure, and the purposes of this chapter shall also include, (1)
preservation and improvement of soil fertility; (2) promotion of the economic
use and conservation of land; (3) diminution of exploitation and wasteful and
unscientific use of national soil resources. .. .
17. 248 S.C. 550, 151 S.E.2d 849 (1966).
18. Sec Meredith v. Elliott, 247 S.C. 335, 147 S.E2d 244 (1966); Pullman
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 234 S.C. 365, 108 S.E2d 571 (1959).
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that the investigation was outside the Commissioner's juris-
diction.
The Commissioner argued that the case should have gone
before him first with later appeal to the supreme court. But the
supreme court, in affirming the lower court's action, stated that
exhaustion of administrative remedies was dependent on "proper
exercise of the discretion of the court," and that "situations can
exist where failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be
excused."' 9
The respondents were accused of violating section 37-1205 of
the Code. That section makes it unlawful to circulate or to
publish misleading statements "with respect to the business of
insurance or with respect to any person in the conduct of his
insurance business."20 The stated purpose of the chapter in
which this section appears is to regulate unfair trade practices, 2 '
not political activities. The court said that so far as regulation
of political activities was concerned the Commissioner was "ob-
viously without such authority," and therefore the lower court
had acted properly.
In the application of the "exhaustion" rule, three factors have
been suggested: "(1) extent of injury from pursuit of adminis-
trative remedy, (2) degree of apparent clarity or doubt about
administrative jurisdiction, and (3) involvement of specialized
administrative understanding.122 It may be helpful to use these
factors as a check list. Here it was clear that the Commissioner
lacked jurisdiction. There was no question of whether adminis-
trative expertise was needed because the "issue was solely one of
law. '23 As to the possible adverse consequences of allowing
administrative action, the court said that, "[t]he commissioner
had the authority to apply direct sanctions against the com-
panies and their agents, either by way of contempt for failure
19. Ex parte Allstate Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 550, 567, 151 S.E2d 849, 855 (1966).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1205 (Cum. Supp. 1966). The Code section states:
"No person shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate or place before the public
or cause, directly, or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated
or placed before the public in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, in
the form of a notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster, over any radio station,
television, or in any other way of [an] advertisement, announcement or state-
ment containing any assertion, representation or statement with respect to the
business of insurance or with respect to any person in the conduct of his insur-
ance business which is untrue, deceptive or misleading."
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1202 (1962).
22. 3 K. DAvIs, ADMNISTRATIvE LAW TREATIsE § 20.30, at 67 (1958).
23. Ex parte Allstate Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 550, 567, 151 S.E2d 849, 855 (1966).
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of the witnesses to testify or by revocation of their authority to
do business in this state. '2 4 Thus all the criteria pointed to the
result that intervention by the circuit court was proper.
IV. LicENsING: SEPARATION op FuNcTIONs
Wagner V. Ezel125 points to an important administrative law
problem-the proper separation of investigative and adjudica-
tive functions. Wagner operated an optometry office in a
Charleston G-E-X store, a discount house for government em-
ployees. His office was an integral part of the complex and he
advertised in the G-E-X catalogue. The South Carolina Board
of Optometry Examiners had revoked appellant Wagner's license
because of his business and advertising practices. Wagner argued
that his activities had not violated the statutes and in any case
that the procedure followed by the Board constituted reversible
error. Rejecting both arguments in a split decision the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the board's action.
From an administrative law viewpoint, an interesting argu-
ment for reversal stemmed from the procedure followed by the
Board. Prior to the hearing, four of the five board members
made a preliminary investigation presumably to decide whether
to take action against the appellant. The court said that the
members "talked with Wagner... and generally looked over the
entire operation." 26 In his appeal Wagner raised the question:
"Should the members of the Board have disqualified themselves
because they had acquired independent knowledge relative to the
issues involved ?.127
There is no way of determining whether the Board was biased
because of its preliminary investigation. The use of information
not in the record is often held reversible error.28 But here the
incompleteness of the statute which set up the Board 9 made the
use of such an investigation excusable. There is no statutory
provision for an independent investigating body, and the Board
had to fulfill the often conflicting duties of investigator and
adjudicator.
24. Id.
25. 154 S.E.2d 731 (S.C. 1967).
26. 154 S.E.2d at 733-34.
27. 154 S.E.2d at 736.
28. See, Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 552 (1951).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-198 (1962).
[Vol. 19
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Professor Davis says that "separation of functions has to do
with the problem of preventing contamination of judging by the
performance of inconsistent functions, including primarily pros-
ecuting and investigating, and secondarily instituting proceed-
ings. . .. ,,30 He thinks it permissible that one agency perform
all these functions so long as there is sufficient internal separa-
tion.31 The Administrative Procedure Act provides for internal
separation of federal administrative agencies. 32
As undesirable as such a conflict of interests may be, case law,
both federal and state, generally rejects the idea that combining
these functions is a denial of due process.3 3 The South Carolina
Supreme Court followed the weight of authority. Borrowing
from an A.L.R. anotation,34 it held that participation by the
hearing body in the initiating investigation does not disqualify
the body from later judging at the hearing.
V. JuDicxrA Rrvmw: INco mLETEwEss oF THE REcoR)
State Board of MedicaZ Examiners v. Gandy3 5 echoes the
earlier South Carolina Supreme Court decision of Drake V.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Ine.36 In both instances the court had to
remand the case to the agency for a more definite finding of
fact. Drake appears in the 1962 Survey of South Carolina Law
and a comment made there clearly applies to Gandy:
The absence of the necessary findings makes it impossible
for the reviewing tribunal to determine precisely what the
facts are .... [T]he agency must squarely rule upon the
issue, for otherwise the court is being forced to make what
are essentially fact findings. This is, of course, contrary to
the basic premises of judicial review of administrative ac-
tion, and quite correctly the court rejects any invitation to
assume the duties of the agency.3 7
The Board of Examiners had revoked Gandy's license to prac-
tice medicine amid charges of misconduct. It did not specify
30. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1391, at 171 (1958).
31. Id., § 1305 at 204.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 1991 (1964).
33. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TiEATSE § 1302, at 175 (1958).
34. Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1214 (1964).
35. 248 S.C. 300, 149 S.E2d 644 (1967).
36. 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962).
37. Folk, Administrative Law, 16 S.C.L. Rnv. 1, 17 (1962).
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which of the charges it had found to be true. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court does not always require specific findings of
fact by administrative boards. 8 The court said that if the basis
of the general findings of an agency were discernible, it would
review the decision. Therefore, in South Carolina a record is
sufficient if it enables the court properly to perform its function
of review.
VI. EARnIns: Dun PROcESS AD THE RIGT To GovmNmNr
EiXo-y MENT
In Williams v. Sumter School Distrkt Number 239 the district
court held that a refusal to renew a Negro school teacher's work
contract because of her civil rights activities was a denial of her
constitutional rights.
South Carolina school districts are under the management of
boards of trustees.40 These trustees are vested with broad powers
to employ and discharge teachers, subject to the supervision of
the county boards of education.41 In WiZliams the board of
trustees argued that the plaintiff's proper remedy was an appeal
to the county board,42 but the court granted the plaintiff's plea
for relief and threatened to issue a mandamus order unless the
complaint was satisfied.
Perhaps the court so readily threatened to issue a mandamus
order because of the type of hearing the plaintiff was given.
The board had refused to tell her why she was not being rehired.
That meant that the hearing was conducted without due process
of law. The question before the court was whether the due
process safeguards should have been applied in this case. The
defendants argued that the schoolteacher's rights could not have
been violated because there is no vested right to public employ-
ment.
38. E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
245 S.C. 229, 139 S.E.2d 911 (1965) ; Long Motor Lines, Inc. v. South Carolina
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 233 S.C. 67, 103 S.E.2d 762 (1958); Cole v. State High-
way Dept., 190 S.C. 142, 2 S.E2d 490 (1939).
39. 255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966).
40. S.C. CODE AmT. § 21-221 (1962).
41. S.C. CODE AN. § 21-230(2) (1962).
42. Pressley v. Nunnery, 169 S.C. 509, 169 S.E. 413 (1933), holds that the
county board does have the authority of an appellate tribunal over the board of
trustees.
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Since 1892 the United States Supreme Court has consistently
said that there is no right to public employment.48 The Court
has, however, diluted this rule and as Professor Davis points out,
"The Supreme Court is quite capable of casting logic to the
winds when it discusses rights and privileges."44 The Court has
held that to say a person has no right to public employment
means only that he has no right not to comply with reasonable,
lawful and non-discriminatory terms laid down by the proper
authorities.45 Davis says this variation of the principle shows
the Court's willingness to subordinate the "no privilege of gov-
ernment employment doctrine" to the Court's conception of the
needs of justice.46 This was the policy followed in this case.
Here the court quoted from a very recent Fourth Circuit opinion:
The plaintiffs are as a class entitled to an order requesting
the Board to set up definite objective standards for the
employment and retention of teachers and to apply them...
in a manner compatible with the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Constitution.47
JoHN C. voN LB
43. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) ; United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
44. 1 K. DAVIs, A iNisTRATmw LAW TnxaATIs § 7.11, at 453 (1958).
45. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 555 (1956).
46. 1 K. DAVIs, AnxiNIsTRaATIV LAW TRATISE § 7.12, at 460 (1958).
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